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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Both theoretical and empirical literatures have identified several channels through which 
bilateral investment treaties encourage FDI in developing economies like providing 
investment protection guarantees and so on. Economic and political interests are said to 
be the driving forces behind signing the investment treaties. However, there is virtually 
no systematic evidence on whether countries consider human rights performance of the 
host country while signing bilateral investment treaties. We make an attempt to examine 
this question by considering 87 developing countries over a period 1980-2006. Different 
estimation techniques like: negative binomial and poisson models are used. The results 
demonstrate that economic interests drive bilateral investment treaties to human rights 
performance. Economic interests measured by economic development, long-term 
investments, return on investments and macroeconomic risk are significant while human 
rights performance namely, political terror scale and physical integrity rights remain 
consistently insignificant. The results are robust to the use of alternative estimation 
techniques and sensitivity analysis. These results highlight that economic interests 
preside over social conscience while countries signing investment treaties.  
 
 
Keywords: bilateral investment treaties, FDI and human rights performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The Foreign Direct Investments (FDI henceforth) is widely perceived as an important 
vehicle for expediting the socioeconomic development of a country in long run (Zebregs, 
2002; Hermes & Lensink, 2003). The importance of FDI is much higher in developing 
and least developed countries because it help providing transfer of technology, 
employment opportunities, boost exports and provides new market access, promotes 
competition and more importantly fills the existing gap on savings-investments. For this 
reason, often developing countries offer various range of incentives in order to attract 
FDI (Chai, 1998). The FDI inflows into developing countries, according to John 
Dunning’s eclectic OLI theory, depends on three major characteristics namely, ownership 
characteristics (O), location advantages (L), and internalization arguments (I). Amongst 
the location specific advantages, apart from other main determinants of FDI1, bilateral 
investment treaties are found to be important because it help shaping institutional 
environment of the host country. The bilateral investment treaties are signed between the 
two countries wherein the host country agrees to entrust the authority of protecting the 
foreign investors’ interest in the host country. Thus, bilateral investment treaties help 
increase the host country credibility to overcome the problem of highly uncertain and 
unpredictable business and investment environment.  
 
Both theoretical and empirical literatures have identified several channels through which 
bilateral investment treaties encourage FDI in developing economies like providing 
investment protection guarantees and so on. Economic interests of investing country’s 
MNCs along with the political interests of the source country are said to often drive the 
bilateral investment treaties between the two countries. But, it is often criticized that 
developed countries and MNCs from these countries do not bother about the important 
social issues like human rights conditions prevailing in the host country. Past evidence 
shows that developed countries like U.S. and other OECD countries do bother about the 
democratic rights and governance issues in developing countries while allocating 
development aid. However, there is no systematic evidence in the literature to show 
                                                  
1 For an excellent review of literature on general determinants of FDI, see Chakrabati, 2001 
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whether countries consider human rights issues when entering into an investment 
agreement with a host country.  
 
The debate over the concern of MNCs from developed countries for the human rights 
performance in developing countries is quite contentious. Empirical findings to date on 
this topic are also mixed (Richards et al., 2001; Blanton & Blanton, 2007).  However, 
when it comes to the relationship between bilateral investment treaties and human rights, 
one argument is that though countries overlook the human rights issues in the host 
country while signing the investment agreement, the aftermath beneficial effects of the 
investments following the treaties result in a trickle down effect wherein the 
socioeconomic benefits accrue from those large investments. This in turn results in better 
human rights conditions. The counterargument to this is that the MNCs from developed 
countries are anyway not concerned about the human rights conditions in the host 
countries. Therefore, this is really not an issue in front of them when they enter into 
signing a bilateral investment treaty with a developing country. Considering both 
arguments, this paper addresses the question, “whether countries signing bilateral 
investment treaties consider the human rights performance in the host country?” How 
important are economic and political interests to important social issues like human rights 
conditions. To examine this question, we make use of cross-sectional time series analysis 
for 87 developing countries2 during the period 1980 – 2006.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we establish a theoretical 
understanding on the relationship between bilateral investment treaties and human rights 
performance. We begin with understanding the role of bilateral investment treaties in 
attracting FDI and why do countries enter into such treaties. We then try understanding 
the contradictory linkage between these treaties and human rights conditions prevailing in 
the host country. Section 3 is about the research design in which our empirical models, 
variable selection and the data sources are explained.  While section 4 discusses the 
empirical results, section 5 concludes the study.  
 
                                                  
2 For the list of developing countries under study, see annexure1. 
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2. Bilateral Investment Treaties & Human Rights Performance – Theoretical 
Underpinnings 
 
2.1. Evolution of Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
 
The strategic motives of firms engaging in direct investments abroad are three fold. These 
include, resource seeking, efficiency seeking and market seeking. Pre-1960s, the motive 
for FDI inflows was ‘resource seeking’ and the increasing level of FDI inflows in 
developed world was largely explained by the availability of natural resources abroad. 
Foreign firms often preferred FDI to trade because of the existing market imperfections 
like trade barriers which increased information asymmetry and transactions costs. Thus, 
firms preferred to circumvent these imperfections in order to make efficiency gains of 
sharpening the cost-efficiency of operations and maximize their profits through 
internalization3. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the wave of industrialization paved 
way for ‘market access seeking’ FDI. During this point in time, majority of the 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America followed import substitution polices. 
Thus, FDI was largely seen as a replacement for imports where the determinants of 
investment were related to the characteristics of the internal markets especially regarding 
the size and the tariff protection and the location of the head office. In this process the 
location specific aspects of the host country also explained the flow of FDI. Every 
country, according to Dunning (1988, 1993) possesses some location specific advantages 
which help attract FDI. Some of them include: natural resources, availability of low cost 
labour and human capital, skilled labour, market size and its potential, trade and 
investment barriers, government policies, exchange rate risk, transportation costs etc. At 
a broad macro-level local specific advantages has a dramatic impact on FDI inflows. In 
fact, the government policies of economic opening and liberalization of foreign 
investment regimes were also considered to be an integral part of such advantages. Many 
countries over the last two decades have significantly undertaken policy reforms as a part 
of comprehensive economic liberalization strategy. As a consequence of this process 
                                                  
3 This is known to be efficiency seeking FDI which was first explained by Rugman (1980) in his “general 
theory of internalization” which was built upon existing works of Coase (1937); Buckley-Casson (1976) 
and Dunning (1973). 
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foreign direct investment (FDI) flows rose impressively. The total FDI inflows of 
developing countries rose from around 3.8 US$ bn in 1970 to just 7.5 US$ bn in 1980. 
But by 2007, the total FDI inflows of developing countries stood at over 500 US$ bn. Its 
share in world FDI grew from 13% in 1980 to over 30% by 2007 (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
Realizing the potential benefits of FDI generated a fierce competition among countries in 
developing world to attract international investments not only to finance the liquidity 
constraints but also to generate employment opportunities. Many countries have pursued 
a comprehensive international FDI policy which includes removal of investment 
restrictions, relaxation of sectoral caps, tax holidays, business agreements, incentives for 
investing in commercial zones, separate FDI law and so on and so forth. Nonetheless, the 
necessity to establish some firm internationally accepted rules on foreign investments 
took center stage. As a result of this, some multilateral investment instruments were 
created like: General Agreements of Trade in Services (GATT) and Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS) by World Trade Organization (WTO). However, due to 
difficulties displayed in multilateral investment agreements and failures of such 
agreements in the past like Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), bilateral 
investment agreements gained utmost importance among the countries.  
 
Graph 1 
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These investment treaties at bilateral level facilitate improvement of market access 
conditions for foreign investment in the host countries. In this sense these treaties at 
bilateral level have became an increasingly important instrument for the protection of 
foreign investment. Thus, the bilateral investment treaties started to play a determinant 
role in attracting the FDI flows. The total number of bilateral investment treaties signed 
in 1980 was 12. This increased to 182 in 2001 before coming down to 73 in 2006. The 
cumulative figure of bilateral investment treaties in 2007 are 2833 (UNCTAD, 2008). 
Most importantly, the growth of this instrument was boosted in the 1990s, alongside with 
the growth of FDI inflows (see graph 1). 
 
2.2. Why Bilateral Investment Treaties? 
 
The bilateral investment treaties are commonly known as agreements between two 
signatories in order to provide legal standards of protection for foreign investors. Usually, 
the bilateral investment treaties are designed to facilitate FDI inflows as a part of 
comprehensive FDI policy of the host country. These treaties not only help the 
developing countries to attract scarce capital to finance liquidity constraints, but also help 
giving signals to the multinational companies that they are committed in providing 
investments protection and guarantees. Thus the primary objective of a bilateral 
investment treaty is to act as a commitment device for the host government. In this sense, 
country with higher number of bilateral investment treaties suggests that investors are not 
confident about the host destination. As a result, to attract foreign investors the host 
country is engaged in legally bounded commitment in the form of guarantee that their 
investments and capital will be protected.  
 
FDI, while mobile ex ante, is relatively illiquid ex post (Vernon, 1971). That is, before 
the foreign investor commits the investment, he has upper hand in terms of bargaining 
power compared to the host country government in extracting the investment incentives. 
The host country like wise also promises good conditions such as offering wide range of 
incentives and other such things. But once the capital is invested, it becomes sunk cost 
for the foreign investors and on the other hand, the bargaining power of the foreign 
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investors is also reduced due to the investment subject to various kinds of risks ranging 
from economic, financial and political. The host country government may then extract 
rents from the foreign investors up to the value of the total sunk costs. In this backdrop, 
the investment treaties assume greater importance because it gives protection to the 
investors in the host country especially during the disputes with the host government by 
engaging both parties through dispute settlement resolution mechanism. The disputes 
may occur due to range of issues like host country government engaging in the process of 
either direct or indirect expropriation such as nationalization of foreign investment 
projects (direct expropriation); undue extraction of rents from the MNCs and / or 
increasing the taxes exponentially (indirect expropriation). Other such risks include: 
failure to protection of property; caps on repatriation of profits and dividends to the head 
office in home country; removal of the tax benefits promised by the government under 
the contract of investments; removal of providing tax holidays; failure to increase tariffs 
paid to the investor as agreed in contract; denial of licenses to expand the business; denial 
of providing land at concession rates highlighted in the contract and backtracking on 
similar such infrastructural and financial issues as promised earlier. The dispute 
settlement mechanism is usually constituted outside the host country in order to ensure 
level playing field to the foreign investor. If the foreign investors feels that the host 
country has engaged in the act of deviating from the investment contract signed and 
ratified can appeal in the international tribunal for arbitration. This tribunal is usually 
managed by International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
which is a part of the World Bank Group, or the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. One of the greatest 
advantages of this is that foreign investor can chose one of the three panel members of 
the international arbitration tribunal, while consensus with the opposite party (the host 
government) is required for selecting third member. This in comparison to approaching 
the host country judiciary system, where the investor will not have any say what so ever 
in the judiciary process, puts them in an obvious disadvantageous position.  As on May 
1st 2009, there are total 287 arbitration cases brought in by foreign investors against host 
governments under an international investment treaty (UNCTAD, 2008). Out of which 
162 cases are solved and 125 cases are still pending before the tribunals. Interesting 
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observation is made by Minor (1994) that as bilateral investment treaties increased in the 
1980s and 1990s, outright expropriations of foreign investments, which were quite 
common in 1960s and 1970s specially in Latin countries, came down quite drastically.  
 
UNCTAD (1998) also highlights the importance of bilateral investment treaties as they: 
 
i. Facilitate and encourage bilateral FDI between the two countries. Thus, the 
bilateral investment treaty guarantees foreign investors fair and equitable, 
non-discriminatory treatment in addition to access to international means of 
dispute resolution.  
 
ii. Provide legal protection of both physical and intellectual properties of foreign 
investors under international law and investment guarantees with a special 
focus on the transfer of funds and expropriation.  
 
iii. Facilitate and act as risk reduction factors for foreign investors. Thus, 
allowing the foreign investor to discount the risk factor while investing in a 
country which has a bilateral investment treaty. 
 
iv. Not only reduce the risk factor involved in foreign investments, but also 
significantly reduce the costs associated with such investments.  
 
v. Provides not only incentives for the host country by allowing governance 
reforms process, but also guaranteeing protection to foreign investors. 
 
Thus, bilateral investment treaties are of great importance to both the investors and 
developing countries (host country) because they help attract FDI inflows especially from 
advanced countries, whose benefits would be illustrated in the next sub-section and 
guarantee the investment protection to the MNCs, thus signaling the efficiency and 
credibility of the host country.  
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2.3. Countries Signing Investment Treaties care for Human Rights? 
 
According to the liberals like Heo & DeRouen (2002) foreign investments, especially 
from an advanced country can provide numerous benefits to the developing country. 
First, FDI brings in much required capital compensating for the lack of investable 
resources in the host country to finance the liquidity constraints. Since investments are a 
key element in economic growth, financing the liquidity constraints would have an 
automatic trickle down effect. Second, FDI help provide new capital, allowing additional 
investment in both human and physical capital, which can be very beneficial for 
developing and least developed countries. Thus, FDI help creating employment 
opportunities to the people in the host country by establishing its operations. Third and 
the most important is that the growth effects of FDI come from transfer of new 
technology from abroad, especially from advanced countries. The theory of the 
multinational firm proposes that multinational corporations from advanced countries have 
technological advantage over local firms that outweighs the cost of doing business in 
external markets (Caves, 1996; Markusen, 2002). Thus, FDI inflows are generally seen as 
a means to incorporate new knowledge from abroad. The transfer technology adapted by 
the local firms stimulates technical efficiencies and thereby improving the productivity. 
This in turn can lead to increase in research and development facilities paving way for 
local technical innovations in the host countries. Fourth, by establishing their production 
units in the host countries, FDI paves way towards exports leading to new market access 
and international contacts.  
 
Proponents of economic liberalism believe that foreign investments from abroad have 
significant positive impact on economic growth and prosperity of the host country. It is 
argued that since FDI brings in these many benefits to the host country, every effort must 
be made to attract FDI by credibly committing to provide investor protection. While in 
some cases, though human rights performance of the host country are overlooked while 
signing bilateral investment treaty, the aftermath effects of FDI once the investments are 
made would be huge, as illustrated above. The contribution of FDI towards higher 
economic growth and development in turn encourage the developing countries breaking 
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down the market and social distortion policies in favor of market creating policies. 
Investments not only create jobs, but also influence consumer choices, provide much 
needed financing to improve health, education conditions for the local communities 
(Rothgeb, 1989). The improvement in socioeconomic conditions help create peaceful 
environment in the home through lower social unrest and economic insecurity (Flanagan 
& Fogelman, 1971; Jacobsen, 1996) and thus reducing the dissent and thereby increasing 
government respect for basic human rights.  Thus, countries signing investment treaties 
might overlook human rights performance of the host country but once investments are 
made, they indirectly influence human rights by fostering socioeconomic development. 
 
In contrast, the alternative perspective is that FDI from MNCs hampers economic growth 
and development prospects in developing countries. According to these critics, MNCs 
exploit the developing and least developed countries to secure their dominance. The 
developed countries enter into the least developed countries in the form of foreign 
investments and active trade to extract the existing resources in those countries leaving 
the host country is disadvantaged position (Frank, 1979).  The second criticism against 
the MNCs operating in the developing countries is that they are greedy and are highly 
indifferent towards the social impact of their operations and also towards environmental 
degradation, labors, and consumers’ interests. Most often these big MNCs engage in arm 
twisting tactics with the local political and governmental fraternity by operating behind 
the doors and outside the democratic control in formulating the policies favorable to 
them. In the process encourage the government functionary to suppress any kind of 
opposition and dissent against their policies and investment motives. Blanton & Blanton 
(2007) provides some historical examples of such cases in their study. They cite the case 
of United Fruit Company in Guatemala and IT&T in Chile which were engaged in 
“restoration of anti-labour, oppressive governments that were hostile to human rights” 
(Falk, 2002; cited by Blanton & Blanton, 2007) when efforts were made to dispute the 
privileges of these investors. In addition, O’Donnell (1979) argued in his theory of 
‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ that authoritarian state was the first and foremost 
guarantor of the interests of the MNCs.  Testing this argument, Oneal (1994) found that 
U.S. FDI during a long period from 1950 to 1986 was largely concentrated in autocratic 
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regimes which suppress human rights because the profits and returns on their investments 
were higher. This, according to many, delayed political as well as economic 
development. The other negative externalities of FDI were also said to result in high 
income inequalities in the society (Chase-Dunn, 1975; London & Robinson, 1989). Thus, 
it is no surprise that the developed countries do not consider human rights performance of 
the host country while signing the investment agreement. On the contrary, studies in the 
literature like: Apodaco & Stohl (1999); Svensson (2000) and Neumayer (2003) found 
that good governance matters for the developed countries like the U.S. and co. when it 
comes to the development assistance. However, similar such studies exclusively on 
human rights and investment treaties are absent in the literature.  
 
3. Research Design: Data & Models 
 
In this study we use pooled cross-section time series dataset containing information about 
87 developing countries for the annual period 1980 – 2006. Owing to the richness of the 
data we use, our N is 2349. We make use of negative binomial regression model to 
examine the relationship between bilateral investment treaties signed and human rights 
performance in developing countries. We choose the negative binomial model over other 
options model for several reasons.  First, because our dependent variable is a count, the 
number of bilateral investment treaties signed each year by the X-country with rest of the 
world, a linear model is not appropriate. Second, given the proportion of 0’s in our 
dependent variable (i.e. bilateral investment treaties) and a high variance of this variable, 
the negative binomial is preferred over the poisson, as the negative binomial allows for 
the possibility of over-dispersion (for more see: Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). However, 
alternatively we also make use of poisson and Pooled OLS models for robustness check.  
 
 
 
 
Where, i t = country “i” at time “t”; d  = intercept; y = regression coefficients for 
variable “n”; ζ = error term for country “i” at time “t”. 
BIT it  = d0 + y1 Human Rights Performance it + y2 Economic Development it + y3 Economic 
Risk it + y4 Trade it + y5 Long-term Investments it + y6 Return on Investments it + y7 
Democracy it  +  y8 Conflicts it +  y9 Natural Resources it  + ζ it 
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BIT it  is Bilateral investment treaties, the dependent variable in above equation measured 
by the count of number of bilateral investment treaties signed by X-country with rest of 
the countries in year “t”. The bilateral investment treaties signed by each country are 
reported in UNCTAD’s international finance dataset for all countries from 1980 to 2006.  
 
Human Rights Performance it  takes into consideration: “integrity rights of people” and 
“state terrorism”. To capture these two broad aspects, we consider the following:  
 
a. Physical Integrity Rights Index: 
 
The physical integrity rights index reported in the Human Rights Database (CIRI data) 
contain information about the pattern and sequence of government respect for physical 
integrity rights in addition to the level. Here, the Pattern is defined as “the association of 
different levels of government respect for several physical integrity rights with a single, 
overall scale score” (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). Sequence is defined as “the order in 
which governments have a propensity to violate particular physical integrity rights” 
(Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). The CIRI data are based on the human rights practices of 
governments and any of its agents, such as police or paramilitary forces. The CIRI 
measure is an additive index constructed from observations on torture, extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances. It ranges from 0, meaning no 
government respect for these four human rights to 8, or full government respect for these 
four human rights. 
 
b. Political Terror Scale: 
 
The next measure of human rights abuses deals with state terrorism. We use data from the 
Political Terror Scales (PTS). The PTS data focus on the amount of respect a society 
gives to personal integrity rights, specifically the freedom from politically motivated 
imprisonment, torture and murder. This is developed by Gibney & Dalton (1997) 
providing data from 1980 onwards and later extended it back from 1976. The PTS scores 
include two components. One is based on a codification of country information from 
Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports to a scale from 1 being best to 5 is 
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worst. The other scale is based on information from the U.S. Department of State’s 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  
 
The final codification is as follows: 
 
Score 1 : Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, 
and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
 
Score 2 : There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder 
is rare.  
 
Score 3 : There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. 
Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 
 
Score 4 : Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the 
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its 
generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 
 
Score 5 : Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies 
place no limits on the means with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 
 
The major contentious issue with respect to PTS is which indicator amongst the two 
should be used. It is noteworthy to highlight the advantages and drawbacks of both these 
indicators. Poe et al. (2001) points out that the State Department data is biased. They 
argue that the U.S. State Department reports lower values (1 – best) for the countries 
which are allies of U.S. on international political and diplomatic front. This effectively 
means that the Amnesty International data is unbiased. However, Neumayer (2005) point 
out that Amnesty International data though unbiased, covers only few countries in the 
early years, leaving aside those countries in which there were no or less human rights 
abuses. In this indecisive framework, we take the average score of both State Department 
and Amnesty International scores.  
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Economic development it is proxied by Percapita GDP levels of the countries. It is 
measured using log Percapita GDP in current US$ of the source countries. The data 
comes from World Development Indicators (WDI hereafter), World Bank, 2007.  
 
Country Risk it indicates the operating risk in terms of macroeconomic environment of 
the country. It is measured using Institutional Investors Magazine’s country credit risk 
index ranked on the scale of 0 – 100. While 0 means very high risk environment and 100 
is no risk or risk free environment.  
 
Trade it denote the total imports and exports of the host country with rest of the world is 
measured as a percentage of GDP. The data on trade is collected from UNCTAD’s 
statistical database on trade & development.  
 
Long-term investments it  is measured by the values of log FDI inward into the source 
country from rest of the world in year “t” in current US$ millions. Two types of FDI 
values are reported in UNCTAD statistical database: FDI inflows and FDI inward stock. 
Since FDI inward stock represent the total investments from past several years flown into 
the country, we prefer FDI inward stock to FDI inflows, which is the amount of 
investments made in the current year and do not capture the past investments. 
 
Return on investments it it is presumed that FDI will go into the countries which can 
generate highest returns on their investments. However, finding an appropriate measure 
for this variable is quite impossible. Thus, we also follow the method adopted by 
Edwards (1990); Jaspersen et al. (2000) and Asiedu (2002) and use the inverse of real 
Percapita GDP and multiply it with 1000. The basic premise behind usage of this variable 
is that “marginal product of capital is equal to the return of capital” (Asiedu, 2002). 
Meaning, keeping other things constant countries with higher Percapita income would 
yield lower return on investments. Using this inverse measure, Schneider & Frey (1985) 
find positive relationship with FDI.  
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Democracy it is measured using the data from Polity IV constructed by Marshall and 
Jaggers (2002). We then follow Londregan & Poole (1996) by subtracting Polity IV’s 
autocracy score from its Democracy score, giving rise to the final democracy score that 
ranges from +10 to –10, wherein, +10 being the most democratic, +5 being partially 
democratic and -10 is fully autocratic.  
 
Conflicts it empirical studies have found significant negative impact of conflicts on short 
term economic growth and development (Collier, 1998). Conflicts affect growth and 
development process in many ways. It leads to diversion of productive resources for 
unproductive purposes where the returns on such investments are nothing but nil 
(Grossman & Kim, 1996). Conflicts also leads to increase in military spending which 
crowds-out private and foreign investments creating huge negative fiscal impact and 
hamper the prospects of socioeconomic development (Deger & Sen, 1983; Klein, 2004). 
We introduce conflict variables as dummy coded 1 if there was conflict in the country in 
that year and 0 otherwise. The data for this variable is from Uppsala dataset on conflicts 
updated by International Peace Research Organization (PRIO). 
 
Natural Resources it  to capture the presence of natural resources in the host country, we 
consider oil wealth as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if oil exports exceed one third 
of the total export revenue, and 0 if not. The data is from La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
The pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data may exhibit Heteroskedasticity and 
serial-correlation problems (White, 1980). But these problems do not bias the estimated 
coefficients as pooled regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for large 
sample consisting of cross section and time series data. However, they often tend to cause 
biased standard errors for coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To deal 
with these problems, we estimate all the models using Huber-White robust standard 
errors clustered over countries. These estimated standard errors are robust to the problem 
of heteroskedasticity (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000).  
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4. Empirical Results & Discussion 
 
The results of regression estimates using negative binomial method in assessing whether 
countries care for human rights performance signing bilateral investment treaties are 
presented in seven different models in table 1. We also control for heteroskedasticity 
using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. The 
summary of data is provided in annexure 3 along with a simple correlation matrix of all 
variables in annexure 4. Couple of correlations is above 0.45. The country risk (0.56) and 
FDI inwards (0.45) are the variables with marginally high correlations. The variable 
country risk was also identified as potential problem variables by variance inflation factor 
analysis. However, dropping these two variables or any of the other control variables 
with high correlations from the model hardly affects our results. In order to mitigate the 
possible problem of simultaneity, we also ran the main results using one lag. The results 
presented in model 6 and 7 include all independent variables lagged to one year.  
 
The results of multivariate regression analysis are presented in table 1. In model 1 we 
include all the independent variables except the main variables of human rights 
performance, which determine countries signing investment treaties. As seen from model 
1, we find that improvement in country risk is associated with countries signing bilateral 
investment treaties. The country risk variable is an index coded on a scale of 0 – 100, 
where zero represent high country risk and 100 represent low or no country risk. 
Therefore the positive effect of country risk suggests an improvement in country risk of 
host country. Since this variable is an index with a very high variance across the 
countries, normal interpretation of the results could be misleading. This is because an 
improvement in country risk by 1% for example in the case of India (from say 60 to 61) 
would have a different effect compared to 1% increase in this variable for Nigeria (from 
38 to 39). Therefore, we consider how much a standard deviation increase in risk would 
affect countries signing investment treaties. The analysis shows that for one standard 
deviation increase in country risk would raise bilateral investment treaties by 0.22%. We 
also find that economic development also plays an important role. 
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Table 1: Bilateral Investment Treaties & Human rights equation function 
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties signed 
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 # Model 7 # 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
 
 
Constant 
-2.939 *** 
(0.39) 
-2.837 *** 
(0.40) 
-2.907 *** 
(0.41) 
-2.827 *** 
(0.40) 
-2.929 *** 
(0.42) 
-2.984 *** 
(0.41) 
-2.955 *** 
(0.42) 
Country Risk 
0.012 *** 
(0.00) 
0.012 *** 
(0.00) 
0.012 *** 
(0.00) 
0.012 *** 
(0.00) 
0.012 *** 
(0.00) 
0.010 *** 
(0.00) 
0.009 *** 
(0.00) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.069 + 
(0.05) 
0.084 * 
(0.05) 
0.067  
(0.05) 
0.088 * 
(0.05) 
0.067 + 
(0.05) 
0.135 ** 
(0.05) 
0.120 ** 
(0.05) 
Trade 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.004 *** 
(0.00) 
Log (FDI inward stock) 
0.261 **** 
(0.02) 
0.249 *** 
(0.02) 
0.262 *** 
(0.02) 
0.243 *** 
(0.02) 
0.261 *** 
(0.02) 
0.230 *** 
(0.02) 
0.241 *** 
(0.02) 
Log (Return on Investments) 
0.073 * 
(0.04) 
0.077 ** 
(0.03) 
0.073 ** 
(0.03) 
0.078 ** 
(0.03) 
0.072 * 
(0.03) 
0.095 ** 
(0.04) 
0.093 ** 
(0.04) 
Democracy 
0.025 *** 
(0.00) 
0.027 *** 
(0.00) 
0.025 *** 
(0.00) 
0.027 *** 
(0.00) 
0.025 *** 
(0.00) 
0.024 *** 
(0.00) 
0.023 *** 
(0.00) 
Conflicts 
-0.052 
(0.09) 
-0.127 
(0.11) 
-0.041 
(0.10) 
-0.155 + 
(0.11) 
-0.048 
(0.10) 
-0.093 
(0.10) 
-0.019 
(0.10) 
Oil Exports share 
0.041 
(0.11) 
0.029 
(0.11) 
0.043 
(0.11) 
0.017 
(0.11) 
0.040 
(0.11) 
-0.035 
(0.11) 
-0.018 
(0.11) 
Physical Integrity Rights 
--------- 
 
-0.035 
(0.02) 
--------- 
 
-0.051 ** 
(0.02) 
--------- 
 
-0.022 
(0.02) 
--------- 
 
Political Terror Scale 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
-0.010 
(0.05) 
--------- 
 
-0.004 
(0.05) 
--------- 
 
-0.028 
(0.04) 
Δ Physical Integrity Rights 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
0.177 ** 
(0.08) 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
Δ Political Terror Scale 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
0.045  
(0.08) 
--------- 
 
--------- 
 
 
R-squared 0.093845 0.095701 0.093792 0.098065 0.094750 0.066480 0.064585 
Adjusted R-squared 0.090358 0.091833 0.089916 0.093820 0.090489 0.062486 0.060582 
Log likelihood -2903.444 -2902.279 -2903.426 -2900.069 -2903.290 -2931.708 -2932.019 
Number of Countries 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Total  No. of Observations 2349 2349 2349 2349 2349 2348 2348 
Note: *** Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; * Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard 
Errors are reported in parenthesis. # denotes variables in model 6 & 7 are lagged to one year.  
 
 
Though the relationship between economic development and countries signing bilateral 
investment treaties is positive it is significant only at 15% confidence level.  We find 
some correlation between the two variables (i.e. country risk and economic 
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development). Thus, we also ran two separate models (not shown here, but provided upon 
request) each with economic development and country risk separately. We find that when 
we ran both models separately, both variables are not only positive but are highly 
significant. Interesting results are found in the case of trade and investments. While trade 
reduces the propensity of countries signing investment treaties, FDI strongly encourages 
signing the treaties. Both are statistically significant at 1% confidence level across all the 
models. However, the effect of FDI on number of treaties signed is much stronger than 
total trade. When countries serve the local market through trade, it is logical to presume 
that investment treaties role would be minimal. However, when countries establish their 
base of operations with subsidiaries in the host country, naturally once the investments 
made would be sunk cost for the company. This exposes the company to the potential 
risks involved in terms of expropriation or host country government deviating from the 
investment agreements / contracts previously agreed upon. Therefore, higher the FDI in 
the host country, the prospects of countries signing bilateral investment treaties are 
greater. The return on investments has a significant positive impact on bilateral 
investment treaties signed. For a standard deviation increase in return on investments is 
causing 0.11% increase in bilateral investment treaties. This variable is consistently 
robust across the board. We now move towards the political interest variable starting with 
democratic regimes. We find support for the argument that democratic regimes are 
associated with higher bilateral investment treaties signed. The results with respect to 
democratic regime are significant at 1% confidence level in all the models in table 1 and 
2. However, future research should focus on disaggregating types of democracies 
(including not only autocratic vs. democratic, but also civilian vs. military regimes), as 
differing democratic institutions produce varying policy outcomes (de Soysa, 2003). We 
also find that conflicts have a correct sign but are not statistically significant. Outbreak of 
conflicts increases the risk perception of the foreign investors and the more intensifying 
the conflicts prove to be discouraging for countries entering investment treaties.  We also 
could not find any support that countries with one third oil exports share encourages 
countries to sign the investment treaties. Though positive, no statistical significance could 
be found in any of the models across the table.  
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We now move to our model 2 in which we include our main independent variable 
namely, the human rights performance of the host country government. In model 2, we 
include CIRI’s physical integrity rights index. This index is coded on a scale of 0 – 8 
where in zero means higher human rights abuses and 8 means lower abuses of human 
rights by the government. Thus, as shown in model 2, a negative sign suggests a decline 
in the human rights performance of the host country. However, we could not find any 
statistical significance for this variable even close to 15% confidence level. In model 3, 
we replace CIRI’s physical integrity rights index with Gibney & Dalton’s Political Terror 
Scale coded on a scale of 1 to 5 in which countries with a score of 1 means lower state 
terror and 5 means higher state terror. Thus, a positive sign of this variable means 
deterioration in human rights performance in the host country. The results in model 3 
with respect to human rights performance indicator are also same as in model 2. No 
statistical evidence could be found in support of the positive results highlighted in model 
3. However, there is some evidence to show that human rights do matter in model 4. In 
model 4 and 5 we introduced a new measure of human rights along with the traditional 
indicators of physical integrity rights and political terror scale. We presume that these 
indices define the current state of human rights performance of the host country 
governments. But the indices do not give the information on the changes in human rights 
performance of the host country governments in the immediate next year. To capture this 
effect we create dummy values coding 1 for those countries in which physical integrity 
rights index increases from t to t+1 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, for political terror scale, 
we give the value 1 when the index declines from t to t+1 and 0 otherwise. This means 
that this dummy captures the years in which there is an improvement in human rights 
performance. The results of inclusion of these variables into the models are mixed. 
Though we could find positive impact of physical integrity rights dummy on countries 
signing bilateral investment treaties in model 4, we could not find any statistical 
significance for the political terror scale dummy in model 5.   
 
These models from 1 to 5 in table 1 could face theoretical and methodological criticism. 
The theoretical critic could be that countries sign bilateral investment treaties based on 
the information on the host country in t-1 year but not of t year. The methodological 
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criticism would be the potential problem of simultaneity between some of the variables 
like FDI and investment treaties. Thus, we lag all the independent variables including 
human rights performance variables to one year. The results are presented in models 6 
and 7. We find that after lagging the variables, the explanation power and coefficient 
values of some variables marginally improved. Also, neither we could find any great 
variability in the coefficient values nor any change in the coefficient signs and 
significance levels. The results of both the human rights performance variables in model 
6 and 7 still remain statistically insignificant suggesting that countries do not consider 
human rights performance as a prerequisite when signing bilateral investment treaties.  
 
 
Table 2: Bilateral Investment Treaties & Human rights in oil vs. non-oil countries 
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties signed 
 
 
Variables 
Model 8 Model 9 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
 
 
Constant 
-2.785 *** 
(0.43) 
-2.848 *** 
(0.40) 
Country Risk 
0.012 *** 
(0.00) 
0.012 *** 
(0.00) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.065 
(0.05) 
0.084 * 
(0.05) 
Trade 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
Log (FDI inward stock) 
0.257 *** 
(0.02) 
0.246 *** 
(0.02) 
Log (Return on Investments) 
0.070 * 
(0.03) 
0.075 ** 
(0.03) 
Democracy 
0.025 *** 
(0.00) 
0.026 *** 
(0.00) 
Conflicts 
-0.040 
(0.10) 
-0.123 
(0.11) 
Oil Exports share 
-0.340 
(0.32) 
0.202 
(0.21) 
Political Terror Scale  
-0.037 
(0.05) 
--------- 
 
Political Terror Scale × Oil-rich countries 
0.128 
(0.10) 
--------- 
 
Physical Integrity Rights 
--------- 
 
-0.027 
(0.02) 
Physical Integrity Rights × Oil-rich countries --------- -0.045 
 21
 (0.04) 
 
R-squared 0.093710 0.095598 
Adjusted R-squared 0.089444 0.091341 
Log likelihood -2902.489 -2901.806 
Number of Countries 87 87 
Total  No. of Observations 2349 2349 
Note: *** Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; * Significant at 10% 
confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
In table 2, we capture the interactive effects of human rights performance in oil-rich 
countries. The basic idea is to test whether human rights matter in countries with rich 
natural resources or not. Having found earlier that human rights performance do not 
matter in comparison to economic and political interests when signing investment 
treaties, we believe the same would be the case even in countries with rich natural 
resources. These results are highlighted in table 2. As seen from models 8 and 9 we could 
not find any significant effect of neither the human rights performance variables nor their 
interactions with oil exports dummy. The same is true in the case of both models where 
we introduce separate human rights performance variables viz., physical integrity rights 
and political terror scale indices. However, we could not find any change in the results of 
the other independent variables to what was found in earlier models in table 1.  
 
4. 1. Robustness Check 
 
We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran all models by replacing both human 
rights indicators – physical integrity rights and political terror scale with the political 
terror scale indices of both U.S. State department and Amnesty International seperately. 
The results of these are presented in annexure 5. When we introduce the index coded by 
Amnesty International, the number of observations comes down from 2349 to 2244. This 
is because for some country-years the coding was not available. The results in models 10 
and 11 show that all the major economic and political factors lead to increase in countries 
signing bilateral investment treaties. However, we could not find any statistical 
significance for neither of the political terror scale indices viz., U.S. State department and 
Amnesty International. In models 12 and 13, we lag all the independent variables to one 
year including both the human rights performance variables. Despite this, we find that 
 22
both the variables still remain statistically insignificant. Finally, we also ran another set 
of models separately by changing the estimation techniques. We ran the same results 
using pooled ordinary least squares regression and poisson methods4. We obtain identical 
results using both methods. That is neither of the human rights indices are found to be 
significant. On the contrary, we do not find any change in the results related to economic 
and political interest factors.  
 
In summary, the results taken together seem remarkably robust to sample size, 
specification, and testing procedure. Both the human rights variables remained 
unchanged in their significance levels despite several alternative specifications. On the 
other hand, both economic and political interest factors continue to remain statistically 
significant despite these changes. Our results taken together support those who argue that 
human rights potentially do not matter while countries entering into a bilateral investment 
treaty agreements.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The association between countries signing bilateral investment treaties and human rights 
performance of the host country is not only interesting but is also most controversial and 
ignored topic in the domain of international political economy. On the one hand, the 
bilateral investment treaties are deemed to be very important because they not only 
provide guarantee to the foreign investors but would facilitate such investments into the 
host country. Once the investments are made, the long-term growth effects of such 
foreign investments are well known. Thus, some argue that though human rights issues 
are overlooked while signing the investment treaties, the aftermath beneficial effects of 
the investments following the treaties are huge. These also help improve the human rights 
conditions in the host country through numerous indirect channels. On the other hand, 
skeptics contend that developed countries enter the developing countries through foreign 
investments to exploit the resources and secure their dominance. This, according to them 
creates uneven development and progress thereby further widening the gap between 
                                                  
4 Results not shown here due to brevity, but are be provided upon request.  
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‘haves and have nots’.  Thus, they believe that the developed countries are anyway 
insensitive towards the human rights performance of the host country and hence it does 
not matter while signing the bilateral investment treaties.  
 
In this study, we examine the claims of both these arguments by considering 87 
developing countries during the period 1980 – 2006. We examine whether countries 
consider human rights performance of the host country while signing bilateral investment 
treaties. Since bilateral investment treaties are count, the number of investment treaties 
for a given country-year, a linear model was felt to be inappropriate. Therefore, we use 
negative binomial regression model. Given the proportion of 0’s in bilateral investment 
treaties could show high variance, the negative binomial was preferred over the poisson, 
as the negative binomial allows for the possibility of over-dispersion. The contribution of 
this study is that this exclusively examines the relationship between bilateral investment 
treaties and human rights performance in a more systematic manner. The major findings 
of the study are that economic interests drive bilateral investment treaties to human rights 
performance. Economic interests measured by economic development, long-term 
investments, return on investments and macroeconomic risk are significant while human 
rights performance namely, political terror scale and physical integrity rights remain 
consistently insignificant. The results are robust to the use of alternative estimation 
techniques and sensitivity analysis. These results highlight that economic interests 
preside over social conscience while countries signing investment treaties. One potential 
and major limitation of this study is that it is aggregate in nature. Thus, we suggest 
avenues for further research. Future research should also focus on two important things 
with respect to human rights performance and bilateral investment treaties. They include: 
one, to extend the same study by applying country-to-country analysis in spatial 
framework. Two, to determine whether our findings uphold in the case of a developed 
country like U.S signing investment treaties specially with developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24
References 
 
Apodaca, Clair & Stohl, Michael (1989): United States Foreign Policy and Foreign Assistance, 
International Studies Quarterly, 43, pp. 185-198 
 
Asiedu (2002): On the Determinants of FDI to developing countries: Is Africa different? World 
Development, 30, pp. 107-119. 
 
Blanton, Shannon & Blanton, Robert (2007): What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination 
of Human Rights and Foreign Direct investment, Journal of Politics, 69 (1), pp. 143-55 
 
Buckley, P.J & Casson, M.C (1976): Future of Multinational Enterprise, Homes & Meier: 
London. 
 
Chai J C H (1998): China: Transition to a Market Economy: Oxford, Clarendon. 
 
Chakrabarti, A. (2001): Determinants of FDI: Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Regressions. 
Kyklos, 54(1), pp. 89-113. 
 
Cingranelli, David L. & David L. Richards (1999): Respect for Human Rights after the End of the 
Cold War, Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), pp. 511-534 
 
Collier, P. (1998): On the Economic Consequences of Civil War, Oxford Economic Papers, 
50(4), pp. 563 - 573. 
 
Cameron, C & Trivedi P. (1998): Regression Analysis of Count Data, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Chase - Dunn Ch. K. (1975): Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and 
Inequality: a Cross - national Study, American Sociological Review, 40, pp. 720 – 738 
 
Coase, R. H. (1937): The nature of the firm, Economica, 4, pp. 386 405. 
 
Caves, R. (1996): Multinational Enterprises and Economic Analysis, 2nd edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
Dunning H. John (1973): Determinants of international production, Oxford economic papers, 25, 
pp. 289-336. 
 
Dunning H. John (1988): Explaining international production, London: Unwin Hyman. 
 
Dunning H. John (1993): Multinational Enterprises & the global economy, Wokingham, England: 
Addision-Wesley. 
 
De Soysa, Indra (2003): FDI, Democracy & Development: Assessing Contours, Correlates & 
Concomitants of Globalization. London: Routledge. 
 
Deger, S., Sen, S. (1983): Military Expenditure, Spin-Off and Economic Development, Journal of 
Development Economics, 13, pp. 67-83. 
 
 25
Edwards, Sebastian (1990): Capital Flows, Foreign Direct Investment, and Debt-Equity Swaps in 
Developing Countries, NBER Working Paper # 3497. 
 
Flanagan,W. H. & E. Fogelman (1971): Patterns of Political Science in Comparative Historical 
Perspective, Comparative Politics 3(1), pp. 1–20 
 
Frank, A. G (1979): Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment, New York, Monthly 
Review Press.  
 
Falk, Richard (2002): Interpreting the Interaction of Global Markets & Human Rights, in 
Globalization & Human Rights, edited by Alison Brysk, Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Gibney, Mark & Dalton M (1997): The Political Terror Scale, in Human Rights & Developing 
Countries, edited by D.L. Cingranelli, Greenwitch, CT: JAI Press. 
 
Grossman, H.; Kim, M. (1996): Predation and Accumulation, Journal of Economic Growth, 1(3), 
pp.  
 
Hermes, Niels & Lensink, Robert (2003): Foreign Direct Investment, Financial Development and 
Economic Growth, Journal of Development Studies, 40(1), pp. 142-163 
 
Heo, Uk & Karl DeRouen (2002): Modernization and Dependency Revisited: US Direct 
Investment, Development, and Polity in LA, 1950-1998. Global Economic Review, 31, pp. 67-93 
 
Jacobsen, Monika S. (1996): Fred og velstand eller demokratisk kaos?—en analyse 
avregimeendring og borgerkrig 1945–1992 [Peace and Prosperity, or Democratic Chaos?], 
Internasjonal Politikk, 54(2), pp. 237–254. 
 
Jaspersen, Frederick Z., Anthony H. Aylward & A.D. Knox (2000): The Effects of Risk on 
Private Investment: Africa Compared with Other Developing Areas, in Paul Collier and Catherine 
Pattillo (Eds), Investment and Risk in Africa, pp. 71-95. New York: St Martin’s Press. 
 
Klein, L. (2004): The Peace Dividend., Keynote Lecture delivered at Ninth Annual Meeting of 
LACEA, San José, Costa Rica, November 5th. 
 
Londregan, John B. & Keith T. Poole (1996) ‘Does High Income Promote Democracy?’, World 
Politics 49(1), pp. 1–30 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W (1998): Law and finance, Journal 
of Political Economy, 106(6), pp. 1113–1155. 
 
London, Bruce and Tom Robinson (1989): The Effects of International Dependence on Income 
Inequality and Political Violence, American Sociological Review, 54, pp. 305-308 
 
Minor, Michael (1994): The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 25, pp. 177-188 
 
Marshall, Monty, G & Keith Jaggers (2002): Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2000, College Park: University of Maryland. 
 
Markusen James (2002): Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade. MIT Press 
 26
Neumayer, Eric (2003): Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative 
Analysis of 21 Donor Countries, Social Science Quarterly, 84(3), pp. 650-666. 
 
Neumayer, Eric (2005): Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? 
Journal of conflict resolution, 49 (6), pp. 925-953. 
 
Oneal, John R (1994): The Affinity of Foreign Investors for Authoritarian Regimes, Political 
Research Quarterly, 47(3), pp. 565-583. 
 
O'Donnell, Guillermo A. (1979): Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in 
South American Politics. 2nd ed. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies. 
 
Poe, Sabine C. Carey & Tanya C. Vazquez (2001): How are these Pictures Different? A 
Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights 
Reports, 1976-1995, Human Rights Quarterly, 23, pp. 650-677 
 
Rugman, M. Alan (1980): Internalization as a general theory of FDI – A re-appraisal of the 
literature, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 116, pp. 365-379. 
 
Richards, David L., Gelleny, Ronald N. & Sacko, David H. (2001): Money with a Mean Streak? 
Foreign Economic Penetration & Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing 
Countries, International Studies Quarterly, 45, pp. 219-239. 
 
Rthgeb, J. M Jr. (1989): FDI, Repression, Reforms & Political Conflict in Third World States, In 
Markets, Politics & Change in the Global Political Economy, edited by W.P. Avery & P.H. 
Rapkin, pp. 105-126, Boulder. 
 
Rogers, W. H. (1993): Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples, Stata Technical 
Bulletin, 13, pp. 19-23. 
 
Svebsson, J. (2000): Foreign aid and rent-seeking, Journal of International Economics, 51, pp. 
437-461. 
 
Schneider, Friedrich and Bruno S. Frey (1985): Economic and Political Determinants of Foreign 
Direct Investment, World Development 13(2), pp. 161-175. 
 
UNCTAD (1998): Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid 1990s, United Nations, New York. 
 
Vernon, Raymond (1971): Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. 
New York: Basic Books. 
 
Williams, R. L. (2000): A Note on Robust Variance Estimation for Cluster-correlated Data, 
Biometrics, 56(no??), pp. 645-46. 
 
White, H. (1980): A Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator & a Direct Test 
of Heteroskedasticity, Econometrica, (48), pp. 817-838. 
 
Zebregs, Harm (2002): FDI & Output Growth, in Wanda Tseng and Markus Rodlauer, eds., 
China: Competing in Global Economy, Washington DC, IMF, pp. 89-100. 
 
 27
Annexures 
 
Annexure 1: Countries under Studies 
 
Albania Ecuador Malaysia South Africa 
Algeria Egypt Mali Sri Lanka 
Angola El Salvador Mauritius Sudan 
Argentina Ethiopia Mexico Swaziland 
Bahrain Gabon Morocco Syria 
Burkina Faso Ghana Mozambique Taiwan 
Bangladesh Guatemala Myanmar Tanzania 
Benin Guinea Nepal Thailand 
Bolivia Haiti Nicaragua Togo 
Botswana Honduras Nigeria Trinidad & Tobago 
Brazil Hungary Oman Tunisia 
Bulgaria India Pakistan Turkey 
Cameroon Indonesia Panama Uganda 
Chile  Iran Papua New Guinea United Arab Emeritus 
China Israel Paraguay Uruguay 
Colombia Jamaica Peru Venezuela 
Congo Democratic Republic Jordon Philippines Zambia 
Congo Republic Kenya Poland Zimbabwe 
Costa Rica Republic of Korea Romania Chad 
Cote D' Ivoire Kuwait Senegal  Niger 
Czech Republic Liberia Sierra-Leon Burundi 
Dominican Republic Malawi Singapore   
 
 
 
Annexure 2: Data Sources 
 
Variables Data Source 
Country Risk Index Institutional Investor Magazine 
Log (Economic Development) World Development Indicator, 2007 
Trade UNCTAD, 2008 
Log (FDI inward stock) UNCTAD, 2008 
Log (Return on Investments) Author’s own construction 
Democracy Marshall, M.G. & Jaggers K. (2002): POLITY IV 
Conflicts PRIO, 2008 
Oil Exports share La Porta et al. (1998) 
Physical Integrity Rights CIRI, 2007 
Political Terror Scale Gibney & Dalton (1997) 
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Annexure 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variables  Mean  Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Observations Countries 
BIT 0.974 0.000 17.000 0.000 1.819 2349 87 
Country Risk 31.267 27.000 91.000 4.100 18.290 2349 87 
Log (Percapita GDP) 7.050 7.038 10.721 4.124 1.376 2349 87 
Trade Openness 70.644 59.097 473.510 1.531 47.971 2349 87 
Log (FDI inward) 7.187 7.273 14.009 -2.303 2.283 2349 87 
Log(Return on Investments) 1.992 2.102 5.141 -4.193 1.457 2349 87 
Democracy 0.328 0.000 10.000 -10.000 6.954 2349 87 
Civil war 0.257 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.437 2349 87 
Oil exports 0.172 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.378 2349 87 
Political Terror Scale 2.859 3.000 5.000 1.000 1.003 2349 87 
Physical Integrity Rights 4.174 4.000 8.000 0.000 2.221 2349 87 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexure 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Variables 
Country 
Risk 
Log(Percapit
a GDP) 
Trade 
Openness 
Log 
(FDI) Democracy Civil war 
Oil 
exports PTS PIR 
Country Risk 1.000                 
Log(Percapita GDP) 0.568 1.000               
Trade Openness 0.434 0.439 1.000             
Log (FDI inward) 0.450 0.450 0.222 1.000           
Democracy 0.172 0.201 0.014 0.293 1.000         
Civil war -0.200 -0.223 -0.253 -0.033 -0.018 1.000       
Oil exports 0.087 0.251 0.078 0.082 -0.212 -0.031 1.000     
Political Terror Scale  -0.317 -0.321 -0.321 0.030 -0.106 0.492 0.027 1.000   
Physical Integrity Rights  0.264 0.299 0.345 -0.062 0.125 -0.565 -0.003 -0.771 1.000 
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Annexure 5: Robustness check - Bilateral Investment Treaties & Human rights  
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties signed 
 
 
Variables 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 # Model 13 # 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
Negative 
Binomial 
 
Constant 
-2.980 *** 
(0.40) 
-3.108 *** 
(0.44) 
-2.942 *** 
(0.41) 
-3.408 *** 
(0.42) 
Country Risk 
0.012 *** 
(0.00) 
0.010 *** 
(0.00) 
0.009 *** 
(0.00) 
0.007 ** 
(0.00) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.071 + 
(0.04) 
0.104 ** 
(0.05) 
0.120 ** 
(0.05) 
0.182 *** 
(0.05) 
Trade 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.004 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.004 *** 
(0.00) 
Log (FDI inward stock) 
0.258 *** 
(0.02) 
0.2701 *** 
(0.02) 
0.243 *** 
(0.02) 
0.247 *** 
(0.02) 
Log (Return on Investments) 
0.072 * 
(0.03) 
0.089 ** 
(0.04) 
0.093 ** 
(0.04) 
0.120 *** 
(0.04) 
Democracy 
0.026 *** 
(0.00) 
0.023 *** 
(0.00) 
0.023 *** 
(0.00) 
0.019 *** 
(0.00) 
Conflicts 
-0.067 
(0.10) 
-0.002 
(0.10) 
-0.012 
(0.10) 
-0.021 
(0.10) 
Oil Exports share 
0.037 
(0.11) 
0.042 
(0.11) 
-0.016 
(0.11) 
-0.043 
(0.11) 
Political Terror Scale U.S. State Dept. 
0.014 
(0.04) 
--------- 
 
-0.035 
(0.04) 
--------- 
 
Political Terror Scale Amnesty International 
--------- 
 
-0.044 
(0.04) 
--------- 
 
-0.023  
(0.04) 
 
R-squared 0.093851 0.083636 0.064657 0.051532 
Adjusted R-squared 0.089976 0.079532 0.060654 0.047282 
Log likelihood -2903.401 -2780.622 -2931.899 -2807.414 
Number of Countries 87 87 87 87 
Total  No. of Observations 2349 2244 2348 2244 
Note: *** Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; * Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard 
Errors are reported in parenthesis. # denotes variables in model 12 & 13 are lagged to one year.  
 
 
